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Abstract 
As the 'Washington Consensus' reforms are losing momentum in Latin America, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) is calling for shifting the focus from the content of pol-
icy choices to the political process of their implementation. As this paper studies the para-
digmatic case of telecommunications reform in Costa Rica it underscores the importance 
of these 'politics of policies'. The analysis finds, however, that the failure of repeated liber-
alization initiatives was not only due to policy-makers' errors in steering the project 
through 'the messy world of politics' (IDB); instead, as liberalization remained unpopular, 
policy content indeed mattered, and only the interaction of both explains the outcome. 
Particular attention is drawn to the political feed-back effects, as the failed reform, pre-
cisely because it had been backed by bi-partisan support, became a catalyst for the disinte-
gration of the country's long-standing two-party system. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Warum Reform scheitert: Die „Politics of Policies“ der Liberalisierung des Telekom-
munikationssektors in Costa Rica 
In dem Maße, in dem die mit dem „Washington Consensus“ verbundenen Reformen in La-
teinamerika ins Stocken geraten sind, plädiert die Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung nicht nur der Politikinhalte (policies), sondern auch des 
politischen Prozesses von deren Umsetzung (politics). Die vorliegende Untersuchung zum 
paradigmatischen Fall der Reform des Telekommunikationssektors in Costa Rica unter-
streicht die Bedeutung dieser „politics of policies“. Sie zeigt allerdings auch, dass Ursache 
für das Scheiten wiederholter Liberalisierungsinitiativen nicht nur Fehler der Politiker sind, 
das Vorhaben durch „die unordentliche Welt der politics“ (IDB) zu steuern. Die breite gesell-
schaftliche Opposition gegen den Liberalisierungskurs bleibt. Nur die Interaktion von bei-
den, politics und policies, erklärt Verlauf und Ergebnis der Reform. Besonderes Augenmerk 
widmet die Studie den politischen Rückwirkungen der gescheiterten Reform: Sie wurde, 
just weil sie von beiden etablierten Parteien unterstützt wurde, zum Katalysator für den Zer-
fall des seit Jahrzehnten etablierten Zweiparteiensystems des Landes. 
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1. Introduction 
Debating different policy choices and weighing their pros and cons has been a classic activ-
ity of practitioners and academics alike. On all thinkable subjects there are people engaged 
in designing and recommending what they see as ideal policies. At times these go hand in 
hand with like-minded policy choices in other fields and galvanize into overarching para-
digms for political, economic or social change. 
One particularly influential example of such policy design is the paradigm of economic lib-
eralization and deregulation that became dominant in Latin America in the 1980s and all 
through the 1990s. In what came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 
1990), a set of policy measures towards market-oriented reforms in Latin America was spelt 
out as recommendations shared by the key Washington-based international actors, namely 
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the IMF, World Bank, and the U.S. government. Prominently among this ‘standard reform 
package’ figured the call for privatization of state enterprises and the abolition of regula-
tions that were thought to impede market entry or restrict economic competition. 
While the liberalization paradigm swept the continent and largely dismantled the economic 
structures of the more state interventionist development model that preceded it, by now 
some disillusion has set in. Economic results are not all that was hoped for, and social po-
larization has increased, rather than decreased. While according to the mainstream of Wash-
ington Consensus proponents liberalizing reforms should go hand in hand with good gov-
ernance and better economic performance and should hence improve electoral performance, 
current trends signal rather the opposite. Opinion polls as well as social manifestations 
show growing discontent with the established political elites in numerous countries, and 
critics of the liberalization agenda are finding a growing following. In Venezuela, Bolivia 
and Ecuador this led to electoral victories of candidates promising profound social change 
and a reversal of liberalizing policies. The pendulum in the public perception and political 
viability of liberalization, ‘this latest project of modernity’ (Whitehead 2006: 194) the conti-
nent’s elites embraced, seems to be swinging back. 
Also within the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFIs) some revision 
has begun. Among these, the 2006 report of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
stands out as it focuses – so its title – on ‘The Politics of Policies’ (IDB 2005). The report’s key 
argument is that a policy design of one-size-fits-all prescriptions is an excessively techno-
cratic approach; instead the authors’ premise is that ‘the processes of discussing, approving, 
and implementing policies may be at least as important as the specific content of the policies 
themselves’ (ibid: 3). 
The present paper will undertake a case study of a core element of the reform agenda, the 
liberalization of state-run telecommunications, to analyze these ‘politics of policies’ and their 
implications. However, while the IDB report essentially looks at this process from the pol-
icy-makers’ perspectives, we do so from a broader analytical angle. Not only can there be an 
overly technocratic approach to policy formulation but also to the analysis of the politics of 
reform, if it understands these as a mere question of political engineering. In contrast, this 
study will re-link the process dynamics of policy reform to its content, in which the liberali-
zation of the public telecommunications monopoly needs to be seen as part of a broader 
economic paradigm shift. 
The particular case under scrutiny merits a word of explanation. For half a century, the po-
litical and ideological importance of the ‘Costa Rican model’ has far outweighed the limited 
economic significance of this small Central American country with a population of only four 
million. However, in many ways the country can serve as a paradigmatic case. With its sta-
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ble political democracy and its high human development standards, Costa Rica has been 
Latin America’s ‘showcase democracy’ and a model for socially inclusive capitalist devel-
opment in a resource-poor Third World country, often termed ‘social-democratic’ (e.g. Wil-
son 1998) or ‘mixed model’ (e.g. Mesa-Lago 2000). This characterization corresponds with a 
widespread perception in the country itself. Modern Costa Rica’s ‘founding father’ José 
‘Pepe’ Figueres Ferrer once put it: ‘Costa Rica is not a country. (...) It is a project. It is an ex-
periment’ (cited in: Ernst/Schmidt 1986: 58). 
Following this introduction, the paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 develops an ana-
lytical framework around the concept of telecommunications regime, which situates the case 
study in a broader comparative perspective. It sketches the three ideal types most relevant to 
this study, and review the emergence of the liberalized telecommunications regime in Latin 
America in the 1990s. We will then move to the Costa Rican case study. Section 3 outlines 
the cornerstones of the Costa Rican development model and shows how these translated 
into a telecommunications regime that was far more inclusive than the continent’s typical 
mould. Section 4 then brings this analysis to bear in the empirical study of the liberalization 
drive which culminated in the approval of a telecommunications reform law in 2000, only to 
be followed by its retraction after large-scale social protests. If this failure of policy imple-
mentation highlights the gap between intra-elite arrangements and public support, section 5 
will explore the reform initiative’s feed-back effects on the political actors themselves, as it 
became a catalyst for the disintegration of the country’s long-established two-party system. 
This political fallout becomes all the more relevant as the issue of telecom liberalization has 
resurfaced on the national political agenda as part of the CAFTA free trade agreement, 
which the current government of Óscar Arias is committed to push forward. The paper con-
cludes by stressing that the failure of reform was not only due to tactical errors in steering 
the project through ‘the messy world of politics’ (IDB 2005: 4) but that indeed policy content 
mattered, and that only the interaction of both explains the outcome. 
 
 
2. The Transformation of the Telecommunications Regime in Latin America 
The analytical framework of this paper centers aroung a concept of telecommunications re-
gime that binds together the specific configuration of economic, social and political actors 
and regulatory frameworks – including structures of ownership and market, pricing 
schemes and patterns of diffusion and consumption in any given country or region. From 
this we can draw clearly distinguishable patterns, which allows to situate the analysis of any 
particular case in a broader comparative perspective. 
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In the following we sketch three different ideal types of telecommunications regimes, which 
provide the conceptual backdrop for the following analysis: The state-centered First World 
telecommunications regime typical of the industrialized countries up to the 1970s and ‘80s; 
the traditional state-centered Third World telecommunications regime; and the liberalized 
telecommunications regime that became such a forceful paradigm in the 1980 and ‘90s, chal-
lenging both of the above and often replacing them. 
This approach links the telecommunications sectori to the general economic and social de-
velopment patterns. In the context of the state-centered First World regime, telecommunica-
tions were regarded as a ‘natural monopoly’: an industry that had such extraordinarily high 
sunk investments, with only long-term amortization, and such a high degree of economies 
of scale and scope, that it was considered too costly to have competing providers investing 
in duplicate infrastructure. Classic liberal economic theory long accepted that, given the 
specifics of the network-based service offered, any single monopoly provider could offer 
services more cheaply and better than competing providers. In consequence, public mo-
nopolies took charge of telecommunications, usually under the Ministries of Posts, Tele-
graphs and Telephones (PTTs)ii. Characteristic of this type of telecommunications regime 
was the state’s commitment to achieve universal service; as a consequence, investment fo-
cused on the continuous expansion of the network with the goal of providing residential 
telephone main lines for every household. The pricing scheme generally was based on cross-
subsidies from long-distance to local calls, from business to residential users, and from ur-
ban to rural areas. 
For Third World countries embarking on industrialization strategies in the 1950s, as particu-
larly the Latin American countries did, modernization theory postulated the OECD coun-
tries as their ‘role model’ for development. However, just as much as the overall moderniza-
tion policies led to only deformed copies of the First World models, particularly failing to 
provide an economically sustainable scheme of inclusive social integration, the regulatory 
framework of the social welfare state, and stable political democracy, so did the telecommu-
nications regime result in a ‘halved’ version. It copied parts of the First World model – pub-
lic monopolies, cross-subsidization schemes -, but failed on others, namely to extend the 
telephone network to include the citizenry at large or to bridge the gap between urban and 
rural areas. 
In Africa and Asia, most governments nationalized telecommunications in the wake of in-
dependence. In the Latin American countries, independent since the early 19th century, it 
was in the course of the ‘developmentalist’ projects of the post-WWII period, that govern-
ments turned foreign-owned telecommunications companies into state-run monopolies. 
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Telecommunications became widely regarded as an integral part of the nation’s public infra-
structure, and nationalization as part of the realization of national sovereignty. 
National development plans, however, did not assign telecommunications investments first 
priority. Instead, the state monopoly company proved to be a profitable cash-cow, chroni-
cally transferring as much as 30 to 40 per cent of its revenues to the treasury (Saunders et al. 
1994: 34). As a consequence, the public telecommunications companies suffered a chronic 
capital drain that greatly reduced their capacity to invest, expand and innovate. Diffusion 
and quality of telephone networks in the Third World generally remained poor. Year-long 
waiting lists for main line telephone installation became the landmark illustration of the de-
ficiencies of state-run monopolies under these conditions. Characteristically, the state-
centered Third World telecommunications regime maintained a strong bias geographically, 
in favor of the urban areas, and socially, in favor of the upper and middle classes (e.g. Clip-
pinger 1976). The goal of ‘universal service’ was not even seriously put on the agenda. In 
1984, the International Telecommunication Union’s Maitland Commission concluded that 
‘in most developing countries, the telecommunication system is not adequate even to sus-
tain essential services’ (ITU 1984). 
In the First World, it was the U.S. government that laid the cornerstone of a new, liberalized 
telecommunications regime when it broke up the AT&T monopoly in 1984. In Latin Amer-
ica, telecommunications liberalization came in the wake of the foreign debt crisis and the 
structural adjustment programs negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank (ITU 1991). 
However, initial steps were more timid than in other sectors. The continent-wide ‘wave’ of 
telecom liberalization did not fully hit Latin America until the beginning of the 1990s. The 
driving force for divestiture of the state-owned monopolies was less a policy choice weigh-
ing the pros and cons of each model, but rather the fact that ‘a decade of economic crises 
during the 1980s left many Latin governments strapped for cash and unable to resist the 
demands of financial institutions’, as the ITU, which had a key role in the international pro-
motion of the liberalization paradigm, puts it (ibid: 2).iii As a result, governments rather than 
national business became the key force pushing for telecommunication privatization.iv It 
thus followed the traditional Latin American pattern of reform ‘from above and without’ 
(Whitehead 2006: 165). 
The shift to the liberalized telecommunications regime came in different forms. In some 
cases it was clear-cut privatization through the sale of the state-owned companies; in others 
it was a process of exposing the state carrier to private sector competition. These processes 
are neither identical nor always concomitant. To the contrary, as the ITU had to note in look-
ing back,that in most Latin American countries ‘privatization came hand in hand with a lack 
of competition in basic services (...). What resulted (...) was merely the replacement of a pub-
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lic monopoly by a private one’ (ITU 2000: 2f.) – an outcome described as the ‘typical Latin 
American model of privatization’ (Raventos 1998: 1)v. 
Being a market-driven model, the liberalized telecommunications regime’s intrinsic focus is 
on consumer demand endowed with purchasing power rather than on developmental or so-
cial goals. While waiting lists for telephone installation disappeared, prices became the key 
to access. Here, the elimination of cross-subsidies and the ‘rebalancing’ of tariffs led to a 
considerable rise in the rates for domestic calls. Again, the conclusion drawn by the ITU 
(2000: 3) is sobering: 
The glitter of privatization has faded. (...) Latin America still faces the hard fact that not 
much more than one-third of the region’s households have a fixed telephone. Even 
though a large proportion of the population is still without a phone, according to con-
ventional statistics, there is hardly any unmet demand for telecommunications services 
in the region. The main reason for this is that local access prices (monthly subscription) 
have generally risen, excluding a great part of the population from the market. 
While in hindsight the ‘glitter of liberalization’ has faded, the wave of telecommunications 
reform in Latin America in the 1990s had found, on the whole, only limited opposition. In 
the ‘politics of policies’ of opening up the sector, it had been of key importance that the pro-
ponents of liberalization could insistently point to the poor performance of the public mo-
nopoly carrier in the typical state-centered telecommunications regime in the Third World. If 
we now turn to the Costa Rican case, we will see that here a more inclusive development 
model went hand in hand with a more inclusive telecommunications regime; and that where 
the public carrier lived much more up to its social and developmental function, also the 
‘politics of policies’ of its liberalization took a strikingly different course. 
 
 
3. Socially Inclusive Telecommunications Regime in the Third World: The Costa Ri-
can Model 
Costa Rica won international reputation as a model country as much by its extraordinary 
political stability as by its far above average performance in nearly all social indicators, 
compared to other Third World countries (cf. UNDP 2006). Public health and educational 
services are accessible for the population at large, and the average life expectancy of 78.3 
years is not only higher than in the rest of Latin America, but also above that of nations like 
Denmark or Portugal (ibid: 283). These achievements are all the more remarkable as Costa 
Rica is a resource-poor country with only a medium level of GDP/capita and a relatively 
large share of the population living in rural areas. 
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The underlying political structures go back to 1948, when a governing board under the lead-
ership of José ‘Pepe’ Figueres, which emerged victorious from a short civil war, laid the po-
litical and economic foundations of a socio-economic model often termed ‘social-democratic’ 
(Wilson 1988). Following the ‘developmentalist’ ideas of the UN’s Economic Commission on 
Latin America, CEPAL, the state took over a central role in the economy, and an import-
substituting industry (ISI) was established, primarily in consumer products, light industry 
and agro-industrial sectors (Bulmer-Thomas 1987: 185-191). Of no less importance for Costa 
Rica’s social cohesion, however, were a series of structural reforms to support small and 
medium farmers, including a gradual agrarian reform and the establishment of public insti-
tutions for technical support and price regulation. These policies ensured the persistence of a 
relatively broad rural middle class that has been a key factor for the of Costa Rican society 
(Seligson 1984). 
On the political-institutional side, the most spectacular measure was the abolition of the 
country’s military, enshrined in the Constitution of 1949. This step was essential for the 
long-run viability of Figueres’ reform project, since it eliminated precisely that institution to 
which anti-reformist elements across Latin America resorted when they felt their interests 
threatened. Moreover, it paved the way for electoral, civilian rule, which for more than half 
a century has never been seriously disrupted by violence or electoral fraud. A stable two-
party-system emerged. Despite a rather regular pattern of alternation in power, the Partido 
Liberación Nacional (PLN), formed in 1951 by Figueres, dominated the political agenda even 
when its opponents held the presidency. The rival second party existed in different constel-
lations and under different names, but since 1983 as Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC). 
While being moderately more conservative, it shared the basic consensus on the country’s 
overall socio-economic model. 
A centerpiece amongst the model’s ‘founding institutions’ was the Costa Rican Electricity 
Institute (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, ICE), created in 1949. The ICE not only was 
the state monopoly company for energy generation and electricity supply, but also for the 
nation’s telecommunications system – a nearly unique combination internationally. It pro-
vided the energy resources for the state-led development and industrialization plans that 
started in the 1950s; and it fulfilled a central social function by investing great sums in a con-
tinuous push for a geographically and socially inclusive system of electricity provision. As 
electricity was a key concern for all sectors of society, the ICE became probably the most 
emblematic institution of the Costa Rican development model. 
Although telecommunications for a long time appeared as the smaller sister of ICE’s electric-
ity activities, here, too, the institution made great strides in the nationwide extension of the 
network, following the same pattern of geographical and social inclusion as the power grid 
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(ICE 1997b). The ICE subsidized rates for telephone access and domestic calls, and engaged 
in outreach programs for rural areas, including the installation of public call offices on a 
concessionary basis in small towns and villages, forerunners of today’s internet cafés. In 
contrast to the prevailing approach in most of the Third World, the Costa Rican model saw 
telecommunications not as a luxury item for the urban elites, but as a core function of na-
tional integration and development. As a result, Costa Rica enjoys one of the densest and so-
cially most balanced telephone networks of all developing countries (ITU 2006). The coun-
try’s telecommunications regime thus greatly departs from the typical Third World mould. 
In line with its exceptional overall development model, the diffusion and access patterns of 
telecommunications instead resemble those of the inclusive state-centered telecommunica-
tions regime of the First World, though implemented in the conditions of a poor country. 
As a consequence, unlike other Third World countries, where the chronic deficiencies of the 
telephone system provided a strong argument for the dismantling of the state monopoly, in 
Costa Rica even outspoken advocates of liberalization like Tacsan (2001) cannot but pay re-
spect to the historic achievements of the ICE: 
No doubt, it accomplished an extraordinary job of networking the whole country with 
telephone lines (...). In Costa Rica, one out of five persons has a telephone line which 
means that virtually every house owns one. The difference is certainly radical if com-
pared to the neighbouring Central American countries where one out of 20 persons 
has access to a phone line. The data is significant in the sense that it shows the excel-
lent performance of ICE in the provision of basic line communication in Costa Rica. 
Similarly, Ricardo Monge, the coordinator of the telecommunications liberalization bill in 
2000 that was designed to open up the sector (see below), underscores the extraordinary 
standing the state-owned energy and telecommunications company enjoys: ‘The ICE is the 
institution par excellence for Costa Rican national pride’.vi 
 
 
4. Liberalizing Telecommunications: The Politics of Reform Failure 
The drive for economic liberalization policies in Costa Rica began, as elsewhere, in the wake 
of the foreign debt crisis.vii It was a PLN government that signed the first stabilization 
agreement with the IMF in 1982, which marked the beginning of a long process of structural 
adjustment programs. In line with the ‘standard recipes’ of the Washington-based IFIs, these 
encompassed the reduction of state expenditures to lower the budget deficit, the reduction 
of subsidies, the adoption of a strategy of export-led growth, and the privatization of state-
owned enterprises. 
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Nevertheless, these policies retained a more gradual and heterodox approach than in other 
countries. If this was partly due to the political-institutional structures inclined to consensus 
and negotiated compromise, externally Costa Rica benefited from its role as Washington’s 
prime ideological counter-model against Central America’s left-wing revolutionaries. Direct 
U.S. aid flows increased greatly, covering more than 50 per cent of Costa Rica’s current ac-
count deficit between 1982 and 1985 (Fürst 1990: 190). In Costa Rica U.S. policy was keen to 
avoid social destabilization due to excessive reform pressure, resulting in the anomaly of an 
adjustment program accompanied by an actual increase in real social expenditures (Mesa-
Lago 2000: 496). 
For the political system it was crucially important that it were PLN governments, the ad-
ministrations of Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986) and Óscar Arias (1986-1990), which steered 
this shift away from Costa Rica’s traditional development model and set the course for a 
gradual, socially cushioned, yet continuous adoption of liberalization policies (Wilson 1994). 
As the study of Seligson (2002) shows, this went hand in hand with a gradual decline in 
public support for the established party system, which, however did not translate into open 
challenges to the political establishment in the 1980s and 90s. The PLN did suffer internal 
tensions, though. Most notably, Óscar Arias’ planning minister, Otton Solís, quit his office in 
open conflict with Arias over the government’s embrace of liberalization (not yet knowing 
that 18 years later they would face each other in hard-fought Presidential elections). 
The pressures on state finances and the overall turn to liberalization did not bypass the 
country’s telecommunications sector. If in the following we track the ‘politics of policies’ of 
liberalizing Costa Rican telecommunicationsviii, it is fair to start out with the Monge admini-
stration (1982-86). Although it did not include the ICE in any privatization scheme, it accel-
erated the drain of financial resources from the company to cover the growing public deficit. 
As a consequence, the company began to lose the capacity for the large-scale investments 
needed for the digitization and modernization of its infrastructure. 
It was the following government of Óscar Arias (1986-1990) that launched the first plan to 
privatize services offered by the ICE. In line with the gradualism of Costa Rican politics, the 
plan proposed the partial sale of company shares and the participation of private companies 
through strategic alliances. Protests from the ICE’s unions and other groups of the PLN’s so-
cial base quickly halted this initiative. In a different line, the Arias government attempted to 
open up the state monopoly for mobile telephony, issuing a license for the U.S. company 
Millicom. However, Costa Rica’s audit office, the Contraloría General de la República, stepped 
in to block the arrangement after the ICE’s unions began a formal law suit against the li-
cense. Eventually Costa Rica’s constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court, the Sala Cuarta, 
declared the deal unconstitutional.ix 
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In 1994, again a PLN government under President José María Figueres Olson – the son of 
‘founding father’ José ‘Pepe’ Figueres – set up a commission headed by former Central Bank 
President Eduardo Lizano, the country’s most vocal advocate of liberalization, to address 
the state’s domestic debt. The commission recommended the sale of state assets, including 
the state electricity and telecommunications monopoly (Lizano 1997: 59). This, however, 
triggered immediate protests from so many sides, that Figueres shelved the commission’s 
recommendations. Instead, he sought bi-partisan agreement on the overall course of liber-
alization which cristallyzed in the Figueres-Calderón pact, signed in 1995 by the incumbent 
President and his immediate predecessor. This pact became all the more symbolic as its sig-
natories were the sons and political heirs precisely of those two leaders who had stood 
against each other in the Civil War of 1948 which had gaven birth to the ‘Costa Rican 
model’, José ‘Pepe’ Figueres Ferrer and Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, respectively. 
Regarding telecommunications, the Figueres government turned to a project that, rather 
than pursuing privatization via the sale of the ICE, sought to leave the company in place but 
break up its monopoly by inviting private competition (Monge 2000: 289f). The project en-
compassed three bills that were jointly introduced in the National Assembly in September 
1996: First, a new ‘organic law’ for the ICE that included the separation of the telecommuni-
cations and electricity sectors, which would operate as independent companies under the 
ICE, recast as a rather loose umbrella; second, a new law for the energy sector; and third, a 
new law for telecommunications. The telecommunications market was to be opened to pri-
vate competition, with a gradualist schedule stretching over five years. However, these bills 
were introduced in the second half of Figueres’ term, when the upcoming elections domi-
nated the calculations of parliamentarians of both parties. As it was widely felt that the ICE 
liberalization would be unpopular, both parties opted to avoid conflict and to postpone the 
initiative for the time being (Monge 2000: 291). 
After the 1998 elections, the newly elected President of Miguel Angel Rodríguez (PUSC) in-
herited the pending liberalization bills. He did present the electricity bill directly to the Na-
tional Assembly, but – learning from past failures – prior to submitting the other two bills he 
called for a consultation process, the Foro de Concertación Nacional. This forum reached a par-
tial agreement, which the government, business sectors and trade unions all signed. Al-
though the PLN (arguing for more gradual liberalization) and the small left-wing party 
Fuerza Democrática denied their support, acceptance by unions was seen as a breakthrough 
towards the political viability of the project. On the basis of these accords, the government 
then introduced both bills into Parliament. 
The telecom bill sped up the gradualist approach to liberalization, envisaging full competi-
tion in the sector as early as 2002. At the same time, it promised to continue the govern-
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ment’s social commitment through the establishment of a universal access fund, FOSUTEL, 
and a new regulatory body, ARETEL. The fund would be financed from obligatory contribu-
tions from all companies operating on the telecom market, amounting to 15 per cent of their 
earnings in the first four years and 40 per cent for the following years. 
When telecommunications reform initially hit Latin America, in a ‘contagion effect’ it rap-
idly spread from country to country. In his discussion of this type of ‘wave theories’ in the 
process of privatization Whitehead points out, that one way for this effect to reach its limit is 
when disillusion with the results of previous experiences sets in (Whitehead 2006: 187). 
Costa Rica is a perfect example for this. As a result of the ‘politics of policies’ described 
above, telecom liberalization had been postponed for so long, that the ‘contagion effect’ lost 
its power for the belated follower of the ‘wave’. Rather to the contrary. Given the the net-
work’s broad diffusion of and ICE’s low tariffs for subscription and domestic calls, propo-
nents of liberalization could not promise much improvement on these anyway; but this now 
combined with the hindsight on the liberalization experiences in other Latin American coun-
tries which had led, as noted earlier, to often substantial rate increases for these services. The 
pro-liberalization campaign sought refuge by focusing criticism of the state monopoly on its 
shortcomings regarding mobile phones and the new digital information technologies. But 
for the majority of the population these were secondary issues; its much greater concern was 
the real accessibility of basic telephone service. And widespread sense of elite alienation and 
corruption crucially undermined the trust that the promised universal service fund would 
fulfil its function effectively, whereas the ICE’s past record was seen as having proved by 
deeds its social commitment. 
In the political arena, the refusal of the PLN and the left-wing Fuerza Democrática to sign the 
national consultation accord led to a new round of negotiations, as the governing PUSC did 
not have a parliamentary majority. The PUSC as much as the PLN pushed for rapid pro-
gress, since both wanted to finish with the issue before the next long pre-electoral period 
would hamper implementation. In consequence, they agreed to modify the Legislative As-
sembly’s procedures to allow for a fast-track approach to the bill (cf. Asamblea Legislativa 
2000), as well as to modify the bill on essentially two points: the time frame for the stepped 
opening of the telecommunications market to competition was expended; and the agree-
ment reached in the consultation forum regarding the composition of the new regulatory 
body’s board was thrown out. Instead of the agreed upon seven members – two from gov-
ernment, two from business organizations, two from trade unions and one from the national 
commission for the protection of consumer rights – the new version proposed a board of five 
members, all of which appointed by the government. The result was that the trade unions 
protested their exclusion and withdrew their support for the bill. 
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Another decision by the leaders of the two dominant parties, bent on accelerating the proc-
ess, proved to be as relevant for the bill’s eventual failure: The decision to bundle the three 
separate bills – the law restructuring the ICE, the law on energy and the law on telecommu-
nications – into a single project (which the media quickly labelled the Combo del ICE in allu-
sion to the package deals offered by fast-food restaurants).x The political rationale was that 
without such a package deal, the three projects could not pass before the end of parliamen-
tary sessions in April 2000, threatening to have the issue stretching into pre-election times. 
In terms of parliamentary process, leadership agreements, fast-track proceedings and bill 
combination achieved their aim. On March 20, 2000, the Legislative Assembly passed the 
comprehensive reform law with ample majority: all PUSC and all but three PLN representa-
tives voted in favor, while only the three PLN dissidents and the seven representatives of 
the small parties voted against.xi Liberalization had become law. But not for long. 
The passage of the Combo del ICE law by the Legislative Assembly proved to be a pyrrhic 
victory. The gradual erosion of public support for the established parties, a tendency Selig-
son (2002) has diagnosed since the 1980s, now broke out openly. The party leaderships had 
limited their ‘politics of policies’ calculations to the political, media and business elites, 
while the popular perception of this project only entered calculations in so far as the deci-
sion was to be kept at sufficient distance from election day. By brushing aside the consulta-
tion accords in the National Assembly negotiations, the bi-partisan agreement not only ru-
ined what had been the government’s greatest success – union support for the liberalization 
bill – but to a broader audience it confirmed widespread negative views of the arrogance 
and detachedness of ‘the political class’. And while the combination of the three laws into 
one package deal had been instrumental to accelerate the parliamentary process, it now 
proved as instrumental for rallying very diverse social forces into a heterogeneous alliance 
of opposition to the bill. 
The least surprising opposition came from the unions of the ICE who feared the loss of em-
ployment and benefits. Other unions of public employees quickly closed ranks, fearing simi-
lar initiatives in their own sector if the country’s liberalization course were pushed forward. 
Unions from that of the teachers to that of the oil workers staged solidarity strikes and called 
for members to participate in the anti-Combo-demonstrations. 
These mobilizations were soon joined by the university students. This needs explanation as 
these mainly came from upper or middle sectors of society, and for them the ‘heroic’ days of 
the ICE’s role in national development could have been distant history. In addition, since the 
students have disproportionately high interest in Internet use, they seemed a prime target 
group for the argument that the state monopoly blocked the dynamic development of the 
new information technologies. However, the majority of the students did not perceive the 
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Combo law as a means to improve these services but instead as part and parcel of a broader 
agenda of liberalization which they opposed. This combined with a wide-spread disen-
chantment with the political establishment, so that the Combo del ICE law became the case to 
articulate dissatisfaction that went far beyond the telecommunications issues in a narrow 
sense that it involved. Following the students’ demonstrations and teacher strikes, secon-
dary students also joined the street protests. Practically all the ecological associations in the 
country joined against the Combo del ICE, particularly galvanized by article 119 of the law 
that facilitated the building of new hydroelectric plants in nature reserves by private com-
panies. 
Another unexpected, but highly important, sector participating in the protests against the 
liberalization law was the countries’ peasantry. Pressured by the fall of world market prices 
for a number of major agricultural products, peasant organizations across the country had 
been mobilizing their bases to demand increased government support. These rural protests 
rapidly fused with the anti-Combo demonstrations in the cities. Particularly in the country-
side, appreciation of the ICE’s role as a cherished institution of development and social inte-
gration was very much present; and it was in the rural areas, where the privatization of ser-
vices raised particularly strong fears of losing the ICE’s developmental commitment. The 
peasants’ principal form of protest was the blocking of overland roads, a measure that 
greatly disrupted transportation and economic activities, exerting a strong pressure on the 
government to act. 
Among the political parties, the small left-wing Fuerza Democrática gained national profile as 
a political force that supported the street protests and voiced their concerns in the formal po-
litical arena. However, the ‘defense of the ICE’ also drew support from dissidents in the 
dominant parties. In the case of the PLN, Óscar Arias’ former planning minister Ottón Solís 
led the dissidents. After quitting office in the Arias administration in the 1980s, he had re-
mained a loyal party member and even parliamentarian; but now he formally broke with the 
PLN to form his own Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC)xii. Another important actor in the insti-
tutional political arena was the country’s ombudswoman (Defensora de los Habitantes), San-
dra Piszk, who spoke out energetically against the Combo law in the name of the politically 
unorganized ‘silent majority’. 
In fact, while it was important for the protest coalition that it could unite heterogeneous so-
cial forces under a common goal, it was even more vital for its success that it could count on 
broad, though less visible support from the population at large. Opinion polls leave little 
doubt that the country’s ‘silent majority’ viewed the demonstrations favorably. A survey 
conducted in May 2000 shows a solid two-thirds majority of those interviewed supporting 
the protests (Unimer-La Nación 2000). More telling still is that no less than 86.9 per cent 
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agree to the statement that ‘protests organized by some groups received spontaneous sup-
port by the population’ (ibid). The poll also confirms the weight of the widespread disen-
chantment with the ‘political class’ as no less than 93.7 per cent of the interviewed agree that 
‘the protests were a message to the PLN and PUSC that the Costa Ricans are tired of what 
they have done to the country’ (ibid). 
The scope and aggressiveness of the anti-Combo protests reached a level of conflict unknown 
in the country’s recent history. When after two weeks the social unrest showed no signs of 
subsiding, the government decided to withdraw the law on April 3, 2000xiii. This decision 
needs explanation, as the government had staked a lot, nationally and internationally, on the 
reform. In fact, in the face of the street protests President Miguel Angel Rodríguez at first 
remained committed to pushing the law through ‘no matter what’; it was additional pres-
sure from three different directions that finally forced him to give upxiv. 
One rather unexpected source of increasing pressure were business interests. The road 
blockades not only affected agricultural products, which rotted due to lack of transport, but 
also companies such as Intel, whose Costa Rica-based microprocessor plant suffered the dis-
ruption of its electricity supply and the blocked access to the airport. While the private sec-
tor largely supported the liberalization law in principle, their more immediate concern was a 
return to normal business conditions. And if the government could not restore order by 
force, business spokesmen urged to do so by backing downxv. 
Pressure also came from the President’s party itself. When the protests did not, as expected, 
subside after the passing of the law, fears grew that the conflict might jeopardize the party’s 
long-term political perspectives. Delegates and party members calculated that the longer the 
government kept to its unpopular project, the deeper the rift between the party and the elec-
torate would be. 
The third element pressuring the government into retreat came from the judiciary system. 
About ten days after the law’s passing, the word began to spread that the country’s highest 
constitutional court, the Sala Cuarta, would suspend the law on the grounds of procedural 
mistakes. At this point, even for the government’s hardliners it no longer made sense to 
stand by the bill. The question could not be answered anymore, why the government should 
keep on fighting at a truly high political price when two weeks later the Sala Cuarta would 
overrule the law anyway. Indeed the constitutional court revoked the law package on 
April18, less than a month after it was passed (Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia 2000). 
‘Defending the ICE!’ as the main slogan of the anti-Combo coalition went, was about more 
than just a specific institution; it almost took on the form of a plebescite ‘in defense of the 
welfare state’ (Bull 2005). The reform proposal was, as analyzed above, embedded in an 
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overarching paradigmatic shift towards a different development model, and the protests 
and reactions it triggered indeed took it for nothing less. 
 
 
5. Lessons Learned? The Political Feed-back Effects of the Liberalization Bill 
The IDB report on the ‘Politics of Policies’ cited in the introduction puts a special emphasis 
on the argument, that ‘policy reforms often have feedback effects on the policymaking 
game’ and that these should be given special consideration when opting for policy choices 
(IDB 2005: 8). There hardly could be a clearer case for this than thetelecom liberalization ini-
tiatives in Costa Rica, as the struggle over the Combo bill became a catalyst for the collapse of 
the traditional two-party system. 
An opinion poll a few months after the ICE conflict showed a strong continuation of the 
trends diagnosed by Seligson (2002): a clear majority of Costa Ricans supported democracy 
as their preferred political system, but at the same time an equally clear majority showed 
discontent with ‘the politicians,’ sharply criticized the major parties and felt ill-represented 
by them.xvi Opposition to the liberalization bill became a channel for the articulation of dis-
content that until then had found only insufficient voice in the political arena. This crystal-
lized in the 2002 Presidential elections when PLN and PUSC together fell to 63 per cent of 
the vote, after obtaining 92 per cent in the previous five elections (Lehoucq 2005: 142). PLN 
dissident Otton Solís, who had broken with the party over the ICE bill, ran as candidate of 
his own improvised party, the Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC (Citizen Action Party). Cam-
paigning on a platform that could be summarized as ‘Old PLN,’ opposing the liberalization 
course taken since 1982 (Solís 2001), he virtually split the PLN vote, gaining a stunning 26.2 
per cent. 
The PUSC managed to escape the electorate’s punishing vote essentially because its party 
leadership suffered defeat already well before Election Day. The candidate favored by the 
PUSC leaders lost the party’s primaries to a complete outsider, the popular TV commentator 
Abel Pacheco. It was precisely Pacheco’s distance from the party apparatus that gave him 
credibility and that became crucial for his impressive ability to capitalize on the discontent 
with the government while maintaining most of the PUSC’s traditional vote, thus winning 
the Presidency. In Congress, the end of bi-partidism b ecame evident, as parties not aligned 
with the PLN or the PUSC were holding 37 per cent of the seats. 
As to telecommunications, after the political disaster of the Combo law, the majority parties 
quickly distanced themselves from the project. The government party’s parliamentary 
leader, Eliseo Vargas, declared the break-up of the monopoly to be no longer an option, 
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since ‘there are political and social realities we have to respect’ (La Nación, 27 Oct 2000). He 
summed up the ‘lessons learned’ as follows: 
The Costa Rican populace has been very clear, and it has said ‘No’ to the opening up of 
telecommunications and electricity. (...) We are no masochists, we will not insist on 
something to which ‘No’ has been said. Any such rumors are malicious. Let me be very 
clear about this: The Combo has died, and it has died forever (El Semanario, 2001: 7). 
In the following weeks, the government signalled a change of course. First to disappear was 
the alarmist discourse that had linked the nation’s fate to the passing of the ICE law. Instead, 
the government started what it regarded as a ‘second best option’: the modernization of the 
telecom sector under the state-monopoly of the ICE. The appointment of Guy de Téramond, 
the country’s leading informatics professor and highly respected ‘father of the Internet in 
Costa Rica’, as the new Minister for Science and Technology, symbolically marked the gov-
ernment’s commitment to invest in the new digital technologies. This was flanked by the 
launch of the ‘Digital Agenda’ program which included numerous state-led initiatives for 
infrastructure investments, diffusion of access, and the integration of the new technologies 
in public institutions, the education and health sectors, and in small and medium businesses 
(cf. Presidencia de la República 2001)xvii. However, this pro-active attitude was not to last 
long. Guy de Téramond was replaced after only two years in office, and as early as in Au-
gust 2002, the government returned to the policy of draining the ICE’s resources, obliging it 
to contribute US$ 13.5 million to the state budget (La Nación, September 26, 2002). 
While most domestic political actors, still traumatized by the Combo experience, kept a low 
profile on the issue, in 2002 telecom liberalization forcefully returned on the Costa Rican 
agenda as part of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). CAFTA promises 
improved access for Central American products to the U.S. market in exchange for further 
opening the Central American economies to U.S. companies. While the initial draft included 
provisions to fully open the telecommunications sector to private competition, the Costa Ri-
can government renegotiated this part. It conceded to opening Internet services, mobile te-
lephony, and data-network services, but not the ICE’s monopoly on main line telephony and 
electricity. On January 25, 2004, the Costa Rican government finalized negotiations with the 
USA and joined CAFTA – pending ratification by the U.S. Congress and Costa Rica’s Legis-
lative Assembly. 
The Pacheco government was eager to point out that the agreement was not a ‘Combo Re-
loaded’. Minister of Foreign Commerce, Alberto Trejos, argued that ‘the ICE will not be ad-
versely affected – it will be strengthened by a modern legislation and it maintains its mo-
nopoly in what it does best: the generation of electricity and the provision of main line te-
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lephony’ (La Nación, January 28, 2004). However, the anti-Combo alliance felt that the gov-
ernment did ‘insist on something to which »No« has been said’. In particular, critics point to 
the fact that the activities singled out for liberalization are those that generate much of the 
state company’s revenues to maintain its socially and geographically inclusive pattern of 
mainline provision and low user tariffs (Fumero Paniagua 2004). 
Moreover, with CAFTA telecom liberalization once again comes as a package deal. While 
the government unbundled the Combo bill, separating main line telephony and electricity 
from mobile telephony and Internet services, it explicitily embedded telecom liberalization 
in the even broader scheme of the free trade agreement. Again, this packaging helps hetero-
geneous social groups to join forces in opposition, CAFTA now taking the Combo’s place of 
galvanizing protest in defense of the ‘Costa Rican model’. President Pacheco became a 
staunch defendant of the CAFTA depicting the horror of sacrificing hundred thousands of 
jobs if CAFTA were not ratified (La Nación, January 29, 2004). However, while CAFTA was 
ratified in the USA, the Dominican Republic (for which it was rebaptized as ‘DR-CAFTA’) 
and all other Central American states in 2004 and 2005, the Costa Rican President, fearing 
renewed social unrest, decided to leave the task of taking it to the Legislative Assembly to 
his successor. 
In the meantime, the political fallout reached new dimensions. Corruption scandals, most of 
which associated precisely with the telecommunications sector, shook the countryxviii. In au-
tumn of 2004, the Costa Rican public witnessed the spectacle of two former Presidents being 
arrested on corruption charges, and a third one come under investigation. In addition, 
President Pacheco himself got under fire for dubious campaign financing. By 2005 all hopes 
put on him by the electorate had dashed, and opinion polls showed him getting the poorest 
ratings of any Costa Rican president in decades (CID Gallup 2005). 
On this background the 2006 Presidential elections came to mark a watershed, sealing the 
end of Costa Rica’s traditional bipartidism (Huhn 2006). The governing party, PUSC, was 
virtually annihilated, falling to an incredible 3.5 per cent. The pro-establishment vote rallied 
around the PLN’s candidate, former president and Nobel Peace price laureate Óscar Arias. 
But the political rise of the candidate critical of liberalization, Otton Solís, continued, obtain-
ing a sensational 39.8 per cent of the vote and losing to Arias by a mere 1.1 percentage 
points. 
Despite his self-confessed ‘humbling’ by the slim nature of his victory, Óscar Arias is deter-
mined to push ahead with the CAFTA agreement. While he does not have a parliamentary 
majority of his own, he may be able to muster majority support in the Legislative Assembly 
in alliance with the remaining PUSC delegates. If past experience is any indicator, it will be 
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worth to carefully watch the political fall-out of this insistence on pursuing the course of 
economic liberalization. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
It is a legitimate subject of study to discuss the pros and cons of specific policy designs. 
However, as the IDB’s 2006 report rightly points out, such a comparative policy exercise will 
not suffice for explaining the policy outcomes and their real-world effects, if it does not con-
sider adequately the dynamics of the policy-making process. If the report argues that ‘the 
political process and the policymaking are inseparable’ (IDB 2005: 4) and that ‘to ignore the 
link between them when pursuing policy change may lead to failed reforms and dashed ex-
pectations’ (ibid), the Costa Rican case is second to none in illustrating the validity of this 
argument. 
At the same time, however, our analysis also shows the shortcomings of an overly techno-
cratic understanding of the ‘politics of policies’. The failure of reform was not only due to 
policy-makers’ tactical errors in steering the project through ‘the messy world of politics’ 
(ibid). While we indeed identified a number of specific decisions that negatively affected the 
viability of the liberalization initiative, only a more holistic view can put these in proportion. 
This must take into account the specific historic trajectory of the country, as the support for 
policy change is likely to be the greater the more dissatisfied the citizenry is with the preced-
ing state of things; and it must avoid an artificial separation of ‘politics’ and ‘policies’, as it is 
the content of policy choices that shapes the actors’ responses to it. 
In these regards the conceptual framework of the telecommunications regime and the differ-
ent ideal types we established proved fruitful as they situate the specific reform project in 
the overarching economic and social transformation under way. Costa Rica’s pre-
liberalization telecommunications regime was one of the most socially inclusive to be found 
anywhere in the Third World. As a consequence, to most of the population the expected 
downsides of opening up the state monopoly outweighed its promises. Hence, it was indeed 
the content of policy, that was at the root of the protests against it. Moreover, widening the 
focus on the social and economic model in which the reform was embedded provides the 
key to understanding why the telecom bill of 2000 provoked a conflict that went far beyond 
an issue of sectorial policy choice but amounted to a virtual plebiscite on the country’s de-
velopment model. 
The case study also highlights the feedback effects of policy reform (even if eventually 
aborted) on the political actors themselves. The bi-partisan agreement on the liberalization 
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bill had secured a more than 80 per cent majority in parliament. It would have been a suc-
cess case for a ‘politics of policies’-minded reform process, if only it had indeed been backed 
by similar public support. While initially there was some outreach to civil society groups, in 
the end the citizenship entered into consideration only as a factor to be kept away from the 
decision-making process, as both parties joined forces to accelerate the legislative passing of 
the bill in order to keep sufficient distance between this and the next national elections. 
The successful negotiation of the party elites turned out all the more counterproductive as it 
increased the popular sense of an alienated ‘political class’ that, instead of representing soci-
ety’s plural positions, closed ranks on a policy measure about whose unpopularity it was all 
too aware. On the background of this crisis of representation it was precisely this bi-partisan 
agreement that became the catalyst for the disintegration of Costa Rica’s half a century old 
two-party-system. Whereas the IDB’s report on the ‘politics of policies’ warns of the ‘trade-
off between representativeness (or inclusiveness) and policy effectiveness’ (ibid: 157), the 
analysis of the Costa Rican case makes a point quite to the contrary: instead of a trade-off, 
we found a direct causal link between both. It was precisely the lack of representativeness 
that crucially undermined the policy’s effectiveness. 
Although the commitment to liberalization policies brought the political establishment to its 
most severe crisis and to the brink of electoral defeat, President Arias, in office since May 
2006, is determined to continue this course. Again, this insistence will be difficult to explain 
in a narrowly technocratic perspective on the ‘politics of policies’. While the proposal on 
telecommunications reform as such has been considerably moderated, in the context of the 
CAFTA agreement it is firmly embedded in a grand project of liberalization, with the corre-
sponding incentives and pressures from the U.S. government and the Washington-based 
IFIs. As a consequence, as much for the government as for its opponents telecom liberaliza-
tion becomes, once again, part and parcel of the broader dispute over the country’s overall 
economic orientation. 
For many years, Costa Rica and Venezuela had been Latin America’s two show-case coun-
tries boasting stable political democracies in a troubled continent. Both worked on the basis 
of an entrenched bi-partisan structure; both began to pursue adjustment policies that be-
came increasingly unpopular; and both came to suffer a severe crisis of representation, ag-
gravated by flaring corruption among the political elite. However, parallels should not be 
drawn too far. Albeit in crisis, one of Costa Rica’s two traditional parties just recently man-
aged to win in clean national elections, even if by a small margin. More importantly still, the 
challenge to the established party system comes from a very different corner. Hugo Chávez, 
a military man, condemns the very origin of Venezuela’s bi-partisan democracy, the Punto 
Fijo agreement, as synonym of all political evil. In contrast, Otton Solís has been a senior 
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PLN politician for many years and he is challenging the government on what could be 
called an ‘Old PLN’ ticket: as a defendant of Costa Rica’s long-standing political model 
which, he claims, the current party leadership is betraying. His party not only acts fully 
within the established political institutions, it actually is giving them renewed legitimacy 
and representativeness. 
It may well be that both, the PLN and Otton Solís’s PAC, can consolidate their electoral ap-
peal and that a new two-party system emerges. But while the bipartisan structure of PLN 
and PUSC was based on a shared commitment to the same development model, this now is 
in dispute. If Otton Solís should turn to an increasingly cooperative stance towards the Arias 
government, he runs the risk not only of alienating his core support groups, but of calling 
into question the very raison d’être of his political movement. As a result, the current polari-
zation of Costa Rican politics over liberalization means that hardly a return to the type of ac-
comodating bi-partidism is in store that had characterized the country for the past decades. 
The feedback effects of liberalizing policy reforms have brought this key feature of Costa 
Rica’s long-standing political exceptionalism to an end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
i  The term ‘telecommunications’ encompasses the telephone system as well as other forms of data 
transmission such as, historically, telegraph, telex or fax, and more recently, of course, the wide 
array of digital network-based information technologies. 
ii  The United States was one of the few countries where telecom services were not provided by a 
public monopoly, but by a private firm, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T). It operated essentially on a monopoly basis, but since the passing of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, it did so within a sophisticated regulatory framework overseen by the gov-
ernmental Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the world’s first stand-alone telecom-
munications regulator. 
iii  A significant share of the revenues raised through privatization, however, went into servicing 
the foreign debt. Argentina, which in 1989 became the second country on the continent to privat-
ize its telecom company, presents an illustrative case: the company was sold solely for debt cer-
tificates (Schvarzer 2000: 13). 
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00). 
iv  On the role of the network-based digital information and communication technologies in the 
drive for telecom liberalizations see Hoffmann 2004. 
v  This is confirmed by the country studies in Noam (1998). 
vi  Author’s interview in San José, April 27, 2001. 
vii  On the crisis and economic policies of the 1980s, see Fürst (1990), Rovira Mas (1989), and Reuben 
Soto (1988). 
viii  For a comparative study of telecommunication reform in Rica, Guatemala and Honduras see 
Bull (2005). The following section draws, aside from the explicitly given references, on numerous 
interviews by the author during a field stay in Costa Rica in April 2001, a systematic analysis of 
the country’s leading newspaper, La Nación, and the press bulletins of the Legislative Assembly 
as well as documents of actors involved, in part found in the archives of the Fundación Acceso 
(San José). 
ix  The creation of the Sala Cuarta in 1989 had been part of a judicial reform largely supported by 
the Inter-American Development Bank and meant to foster free market development (Wilson et 
al. 2004). However, as Wilson et al. point out, its effect on policy-making has not been quite that, 
and they take the Sala Cuarta’s role in the liberalization of telecommunications as a case in point 
(ibid: 525-527). 
x  The bill’s official name is ‘Ley para el mejoramiento de servicios públicos de electricidad y tele-
comunicaciones y de la participación del Estado’. 
xi  Besides the three delegates of the left-wing Fuerza Democrática, this was one representative each 
from the Partido Acción Laborista Alajuelense, the Partido Renovación Costarricense, the Partido Inte-
gración Nacional, and the Movimiento Libertario. 
xii  Within the governing PUSC, it was ex-President Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982) who led a ‘National 
Citizens’ Front’ (Frente Cívico Nacional) against the liberalization law and was supported by, 
amongst others, the social-Christian trade union Confederación de Trabajadores Rerum Novarum. 
xiii  To save face, the government did not cancel the law altogether, but called for a 60-day freeze to 
open up a national dialogue. A ‘Mixed Commission’ (Comisión Mixta) was set up and a broad 
spectrum of political and social actors invited to discuss and reformulate the bill. However, this 
was more a conciliatory measure than an actual attempt to produce and implement a new law. 
xiv  The following draws on one of the President’s closest advisors who on the condition of anonym-
ity recounted the political dynamics of the law’s withdrawal from the executive’s perspective 
(interview with the author, April 28, 2001 in San José). 
xv  It is worth to underscore that the Costa Rican government lacked the option for ‘restoring order’ 
by repressive force. The use of the country’s police for a large-scale repressive action against 
non-violent protest with broad public support would have shaken the foundations of the coun-
try’s political and social system so profoundly that it was excluded. Moreover, the government 
was well aware of its limited practical ability to implement any such a repressive strategy. In the 
words of the anonymous Presidential advisor cited above: ‘In any other country the government 
would declare a state of emergency, and if strikes would endanger the national electricity gen-
eration, the army would take over the power plants and guarantee at least a minimum of elec-
tricity supply. In Costa Rica, however, if the ICE staff refuses to produce electricity, there simply 
does not exist any other institution which technically would be able to operate it.’ 
xvi  Cf. La Nación, September 11, 2000: ‘Desilusión y esperanza en ticos’, September 12, 2000: ‘Fuerte 
apoyo a la democracia... pero crítica a los partidos y poderes del Estado’, and September 14, 
2000: ‘Dura crítica a partidos’. 
xvii  For a more detailed analysis of these initiatives in expanding the digital technologies see 
Hoffmann (2004: 119-137) and Téramond (20
xviii  On the corruption scandals and their political implications see Lehoucq 2005, Salom 2005, and 
Peeler 2006. 
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